Abstract. Can you guarantee secrecy even if an adversary can eavesdrop on your brain? We consider the problem of protecting privacy in circuits, when faced with an adversary that can access a bounded number of wires in the circuit. This question is motivated by side channel attacks, which allow an adversary to gain partial access to the inner workings of hardware. Recent work has shown that side channel attacks pose a serious threat to cryptosystems implemented in embedded devices. In this paper, we develop theoretical foundations for security against side channels. In particular, we propose several efficient techniques for building private circuits resisting this type of attacks. We initiate a systematic study of the complexity of such private circuits, and in contrast to most prior work in this area provide a formal threat model and give proofs of security for our constructions.
Introduction
This paper concerns the following fascinating question: Is it possible to maintain secrecy even if an adversary can eavesdrop on your brain? A bit more precisely, can we guarantee privacy when one of the basic assumptions of cryptography breaks down, namely, when the adversary can gain access to the insides of the hardware that is making use of our secrets? We formalize this question in terms of protecting privacy in circuits, where an adversary can access a bounded number of wires in the circuit. We initiate the study of this problem and present several efficient techniques for achieving this new type of privacy. Before describing the model and our contribution in more detail, we motivate the problem by providing some necessary background.
Background
Our understanding of cryptography has made tremendous strides in the past three decades, fueled in large part by the success of analysis-and proof-driven design. Most such work has analyzed algorithms, not implementations: typically one thinks of a cryptosystem as a black box implementing some mathematical function and implicitly assumes the implementation faithfully outputs what the function would (and nothing else). However, in practice implementations are not always a true black box: partial information about internal computations can be leaked (either directly or through sidechannels), and this may put security at risk.
This difference between implementations and algorithms has led to successful attacks on many cryptographic implementations, even where the underlying algorithm Ý Work done in part while at Princeton University.
was quite sound. For instance, the power consumed during an encryption operation or the time it takes for the operation to complete can leak information about intermediate values during the computation [25, 26] , and this has led to practical attacks on smartcards. Electromagnetic radiation [33, 16, 34] , compromising emanations [36] , crosstalk onto the power line [37, 35] , return signals obtained by illuminating electronic equipment [3, 35] , magnetic fields [32] , cache hit ratios [24, 30] , and even sounds given off by rotor machines [23] can similarly give the attacker a window of visibility on internal values calculated during the computation. Also of interest is the probing attack, where the attacker places a metal needle on a wire of interest and reads off the value carried along that wire during the smartcard's computation [2] . In general, side channel attacks have proven to be a significant threat to the security of embedded devices.
The failure of proof-driven cryptography to anticipate these risks comes from an implicit assumption in many 1 currently accepted definitions in theoretical cryptography, namely, the secrecy assumption. The secrecy assumption states that legitimate participants in a cryptographic computation can keep intermediate values and key material secret during a local computation. For instance, by modeling a chosen-plaintext attack on the encryption scheme as an algorithm with oracle access to , we implicitly assume that the device implementing outputs only ´Üµ on input Ü, and does not leak anything else about the computation of ´Üµ. Thus the 'Standard Model' in theoretical cryptography often takes the secrecy assumption for granted, but as we have seen, there are a bevy of ways that the secrecy assumption can fail in real systems.
One possible reaction is to study implementation techniques that ensure the secrecy assumption will always hold. For instance, we can consider adding large capacitors to hide the power consumption, switch to dual-rail logic so that power consumption will be independent of the data, shield the device in a tamper-resistant Faraday cage to prevent information leakage through RF emanations, and so on. Many such hardware countermeasures have been proposed in the literature. However, a limitation of such approaches is that, generally speaking, each such countermeasure must be specially tailored for the set of side channels it is intended to defeat, and one can only plan a defense if one knows in advance what side channels an attacker might try to exploit. Consequently, if the designer cannot predict all possible ways in which information might leak, hardware countermeasures cannot be counted on to defend reliably against side channel attacks.
This leaves reason to be concerned that hardware countermeasures may not be enough on their own to guarantee security. If the attacker discovers a new class of side channel attacks not anticipated by the system designer, all bets are off. Given the wide variety of side channel attacks that have been discovered up till now, this seems like a significant risk: As a general rule of thumb, wherever three or four such vulnerabilities are known, it would be prudent to assume that there may be another, similar but unknown vulnerability lurking in the wings waiting to be discovered. In particular, it is hard to predict what other types of side channel pitfalls might be discovered in the future, and as a result, it is hard to gain confidence that any given implementation will be free of side channels. This is a "risk of the unknown", rather than a known risk 2 , and risks of the unknown are the worst kind of risks to assume. Consequently, the secrecy assumption seems optimistic, and we submit that hardware countermeasures may not be the final answer.
A different possible response is to design algorithms that, when implemented, will be inherently robust against side channel attacks. For instance, Daemen and Rijmen proposed replacing each wire of a circuit by two wires, one carrying the original bit and the other its complement [15] ; Messerges proposed "data masking", where each value is split into two shares using a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme [27] ; Goubin and Patarin suggested a "duplication" method based on similar methods [21] ; and many other proposals can be found in the literature. However, none of those schemes have been proven secure, and unsurprisingly, some have since been broken [11, 14] . This experience suggests that the field needs to be put on solid theoretical foundations. For obvious reasons, we would prefer a principled approach that has been proven secure over an ad-hoc countermeasure.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we take on this challenge. Working in the context of Boolean circuits, we show how to implement cryptosystems (or any algorithm) in a way that can tolerate the presence of a large class of side channel attacks without loss of security. In particular, we show how to transform any circuit implementing some cryptographic algorithm into another, larger circuit that implements the same functionality but that will remain secure even if the attacker can observe up to any Ø internal bits produced during the computation within one clock cycle.
As a result, our constructions provide a generic defense against probing attacks. They are generic in the sense that we defend against a large class of attacks. To defend against information leakage, we do not need to know how the information might leak; rather, we only need to predict how much information might leak or at what rate. Our constructions are also generic in the sense that they apply to any cryptosystem of interest: rather than trying to secure just, say, AES encryption, we show that any circuit whatsoever can be made robust against probing attacks.
Also, we emphasize that our constructions are provably secure. We develop a formal model of the adversary, propose definitions of security against probing attacks, and prove that our constructions meet these definitions. This puts the field on a principled theoretical footing and removes fears that our proposals might be broken by cryptanalysis.
OUR MODEL. Ideally, we would like to achieve security against an all-powerful attacker, i.e. one that can observe every internal value produced during the computation. However, this task is generally impossible to achieve, as follows from the impossibility of obfuscation [4] . Instead, we settle for achieving security against adversaries that are limited in their power to observe the computation. There are many ways we could consider limiting the adversary, but in this paper we choose a simple metric: a Ø-limited adversary is one that can observe at most Ø wires of the circuit within a certain time period (such as during one clock cycle). 3 We believe this is a reasonable restriction, as most side channels give the attacker only partial information about the computation. In particular, in probing attacks the cost of micro-probing equipment is directly related to the number of needles one can manipulate at one time-a station with five probes 3 By default, we allow the adversary to adaptively move its Ø probes between time periods, but not within a time period. See Section 2 for more details. is considerably more expensive than one with only a single probe-and so an attacker is limited in the number of wires that can be observed at any one time. Consequently, the value Ø is a good measure of the cost of a probing attack. We refer the reader to Section 2 for a more detailed treatment of the model, in particular for the useful case of stateful circuits which carry state information from one invocation to the next. Our model can be compared to that of Chari, et al., who took a first step by analyzing -out-of-secret sharing in a model where the attacker can obtain a noisy view of all circuit elements [11] , with applications to security against power analysis. That work, however, did not provide security against probing attacks or other side channels where the attacker can view any Ø wires of his choosing, and our constructions are quite different from theirs. Also of relevance are works on exposure-resilient functions and all-or-nothing transforms (e.g. [9] ), which attempt to efficiently secure storage (but not computation) against probing attacks, and work on oblivious RAM (cf. [20] ) aimed at protecting software by hiding the access pattern of a (trusted) CPU.
MPC ON SILICON? There is an interesting relation between the problem we study and that of secure multi-party computation (MPC). In some sense, our contribution may be viewed as a novel application of MPC techniques to the design of secure hardware. We would like to stress, however, that our focus and goals are quite different from the traditional ones in the MPC literature, and that our main results are not derived from state-of-the-art results in this area. We refer the reader to Appendix A for a detailed discussion of the relation between our problem and the MPC problem.
OUR RESULTS. Our basic results are as follows. We show that any circuit with Ò gates can be transformed into a circuit of size Ç´ÒØ ¾ µ that is perfectly secure against all probing attacks leaking up to Ø bits at a time (see Section 4). This general transformation increases circuit size by a factor of Ç´Ø ¾ µ, but for some specific cryptosystems we can do better. For PRG's, we can find constructions that yield an Ç´ÒØµ transformed circuit size, rather than Ç´ÒØ ¾ µ (Section 6). Finally, we present statistically private transformations which significantly improve the asymptotic efficiency of previous constructions, but whose concrete efficiency becomes better only when Ø is quite large. See Table 1 for a summary of the main results. Additional results, such as a trading circuit size for increased latency, will be included in the full version of this paper.
We do not know how practical our constructions will be. However, our results already show that the cost of security is not too high. Since many cryptosystems can be implemented quite efficiently in hardware (e.g., Ò ½¼ ¿ or ½¼ gates), and since our use of big-Ç´µ notation typically does not hide any large constants, it seems that security using our techniques is within the reach of modern systems. We leave a more thorough performance analysis to others.
Definitions
Circuits. We will examine probing attacks in the setting of Boolean circuits. A deterministic circuit is a directed acyclic graph whose vertices are Boolean gates and whose edges are wires. We will assume without loss of generality that every gate has fan-in at most 2 and fan-out at most 3. A randomized circuit is a circuit augmented with random-bit gates. A random-bit gate is a gate with fan-in 0 that produces a random bit and sends it along its output wire; the bit is selected uniformly and independently of everything else afresh for each invocation of the circuit.
The size of a circuit (usually denoted by Ò) is defined as the number of gates and its depth is the length of the longest path from an input to an output. We will sometimes consider a width-Û depth-layered circuit, where the underlying graph is a depthlayered graph with at most Û wires connecting two adjacent layers.
A stateful circuit is a circuit augmented with memory cells. A memory cell is a stateful gate with fan-in 1: on any invocation of the circuit, it outputs the previous input to the gate, and stores the current input for the next invocation. Thus, memory cells act as delay elements. We extend the usual definition of a circuit by allowing stateful circuits to possibly contain cycles, so long as every cycle traverses at least one memory cell. When specifying a stateful circuit, we must also specify an initial state for the memory cells. When denotes a circuit with memory cells and × ¼ an initial state for the memory cells, we write × ¼ ℄ for the circuit with memory cells initially filled with × ¼ . Stateful circuits can also have external input and output wires. For instance, in an AES circuit the internal memory cells contain the secret key, the input wires a plaintext, and the output wires produce the corresponding ciphertext.
We define two distinct notions of security, for stateless and stateful circuits. While we view the stateful model as more interesting from an application point of view, the stateless model is somewhat cleaner and solutions for this model are used as the basis for solutions for the stateful model. PRIVACY. We require that ¼ be private against a Ø-limited interactive adversary. Specifically, the adversary is given access to ¼ initialized with × ¼ ¼ as its internal state. Then, the adversary may invoke ¼ multiple times, adaptively choosing the inputs based on the observed outputs. Prior to each invocation, the adversary may fix an arbitrary set of Ø internal wires to which it will gain access in that invocation. We stress that while this choice may be adaptive between invocations, i.e., may depend on the outputs and on wire values observed in previous invocations, the adversary is assumed to be too slow to move its probes while the values propagate through the circuit. 4 To define privacy against such a Ø-limited adversary, we require the existence of a simulator which can simulate the adversary's view using only a black-box access to ¼ , i.e., without having access to any internal wires. 5 Note that randomization is vital for stateful transformers, for otherwise it is impossible to hide the initial state from the adversary. However, apart from the (trusted) randomized initialization, the circuit ¼ may be deterministic.
We distinguish between three types of transformers: perfect, statistical, and computational, corresponding to the quality of indistinguishability in the soundness requirement and the type of emulation provided by the simulator. For the latter two types of security, we assume that Ì is also given a security parameter in terms of which the indistinguishability is defined and the complexity of Ì is measured.
Privacy for stateless circuits. In contrast to the stateful case, where inputs and outputs are considered public and it is only the internal state that is hidden, privacy for stateless circuits should keep both inputs and outputs hidden in every invocation. To make this possible, we allow the use of a randomized input encoder Á and an output decoder Ç, a pair of circuits whose internal wires cannot be probed by the adversary. Both Á and Ç should be independent of the circuit being transformed, and will typically require a small number of gates to compute. Thus, they may be thought of as being implemented by expensive tamper-resistant hardware components. A private stateless transformer can now be defined similarly to the stateful case.
Let Ì be an efficiently computable deterministic function mapping a stateless circuit to a stateless circuit ¼ , and let Á Ç be as above. We say that´Ì Á Çµ is a Ø-private stateless transformer if it satisfies soundness and privacy, defined as follows:
SOUNDNESS. The input-output functionality of ÇAE ¼ AEÁ (i.e., the iterated application of Á ¼ Ç in that order) is indistinguishable from that of . Note that in the deterministic case this implies functional equivalence.
PRIVACY. We require that the view of any Ø-limited adversary, which attacks Ç AE ¼ AE Á by probing at most Ø wires in ¼ , can be simulated from scratch, i.e. without access to any wire in the circuit. As in the stateful case, the identity of the probed wires has to be chosen in advance by the adversary.
Perfect Privacy for Stateless Circuits
In this section we present our first construction for protecting privacy in stateless circuits. In the next section we will show how to use this to achieve protection for the more useful model of stateful circuits, where the contents of memory are to be protected.
Similarly to interactive protocols for secure multi-party computation (e.g., [6, 19] ), our construction makes use of a simple secret-sharing scheme. The new twist in the circuit setting is that the atomic unit of information observable by the adversary is any intermediate computation rather than an entire party in the protocol setting. We achieve our result through a careful choice of intermediate computations, which allows us to obtain privacy without losing efficiency. The constants involved in the result we present here are quite small, and this construction may be of practical value. We now establish: In this way, each AND gate in is expanded to a "gadget" of Ç´Ñ ¾ µ gates in ¼ , and the gadgets in ¼ are connected in the same way that the AND gates of are connected. The resulting circuit, call it ¼ , is the transformed version of produced by Ì: i.e., we define Ì´ µ ¼ , with ¼ as above. This completes the description of Ì. 6 Note that there is a way to slightly modify this construction which requires Ñ Ø instead of Ñ ¾Ø. See below.
Clearly, this construction preserves the functionality of the original circuit. To prove Ø-privacy, we must show how to simulate the view of the Ø-limited adversary without knowing the input values for . The simulation will proceed by running the adversary, and providing it with answers to its Ø queries. We will show that the distribution of answers our simulation provides is identical to the distribution the adversary would obtain in a real attack on ¼ .
The simplest description of the simulator is just this: Answer all adversary queries based on the evaluation of the circuit ¼ when fed uniform and independent bits as input. In order to prove that this simulation works, we give a different description of the simulator. We first describe the simulator for a circuit consisting of a single AND gate, and then extend the proof and simulation to the general case.
SIMULATION FOR A SINGLE GATE. Let ¼ be the transformed circuit, consisting of a single gadget, with input wires and , and outputs . Recall that in a true evaluation of ¼ , the 's and 's are additive secret shares with the property that any Ñ shares from the 's are distributed as uniform independent random bits, and similarly for the 's. We will argue that a perfect simulation of the adversary's query responses is possible based on knowledge of Ñ or fewer shares from the 's and the 's. Since such a collection of shares is distributed uniformly, this will establish our result.
Suppose an adversary corrupts wires Û ½ Û Ø in ¼ . We will define a set Á Ñ · ½℄ of indices such that the joint distribution of values assigned to the wires Û (for any specific inputs and to the original circuit ) can be perfectly and efficiently simulated given the values of Á ´ µ ¾Á and Á . As mentioned above, the values Á and Á , in turn, can be perfectly simulated by picking them uniformly and independently at random, as long as Á Ñ. Hence, it suffices to describe a procedure for constructing the set Á and simulating the values of the Ø corrupted wires Û given Á and Á . We describe such a procedure now. 
, however, we are making use of the fact that by construction, Þ will never be used in the computation of any Û . Hence we can treat Þ as a uniformly random and independent value. 7 We note that by changing the construction slightly, namely by computing´ · Öµ and Ö where Ö is a fresh random value, we could have avoided increasing Á by 2 indices rather than RE-RANDOMIZED OUTPUTS. We observe that as long as every output of ¼ has passed through one AND gadget (if this is not the case, we can artificially AND an output bit with itself), then for each original output bit, the encoded outputs are Ñ-wise independent even given the entire encoding of the inputs. This can be used to prove that the construction is in fact secure against a stronger type of adversary who may observe at most Ø ¼ wires in each gadget, where Ø ¼ ª´Øµ.
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IMPROVEMENT IN RANDOMNESS USE. We note, omitting the proof in this abstract, that in the above construction the same randomness (i.e., the choices of Þ for ) could be used in all the gadgets. This reduces the number of random bits to Ç´Ø ¾ µ.
UNPROTECTED INPUTS AND OUTPUTS. We have described the construction above for protecting all inputs and outputs. It is easy to modify the construction so that certain inputs and outputs are unencoded, and may be observed by both the adversary and the simulator. This is useful in the stateful model, discussed next.
Perfect Privacy for Stateful Circuits
In this section we show how to achieve privacy in the stateful model, as defined in Section 2. This model is perhaps much more natural and realistic than the stateless model we considered in the previous section; however, as we show below, achieving privacy in this model is easy once privacy has been achieved in the stateless model.
Our goal is to transform a stateful circuit into a Ø-private stateful circuit ¼ by using a privacy transformer for the stateless case. We now describe the construction.
Recall that a stateless privacy transformer must encode the input in some way; we assume that the output is encoded using the same encoding. We also assume that the stateless transformer enjoys the re-randomized outputs property, namely that the output encoding for each original output bit is Ø-wise independent even given all encodings of input bits. Let us refer to the encoding of the stateless transformer as Ø´Ü µ, where Ø is the privacy threshold of the stateless transformer, and Ü is the input being transformed.
We represent each memory cell in using the same representation. Relying on our stateless transformer as a building block, a stateful transformer Ì ´Ì Ì × µ can proceed as follows. The memory Ü of is stored in ¼ in encoded form ¾Ø´Ü µ. ¼ will work by considering the transformed memory ¾Ø´Ü µ as an input to the original circuit , which is transformed using the stateless ¾Ø-privacy transformation. We also modify so that the next state of the memory is always an output. Then, these encoded outputs are fed back into memory for the next clock cycle. The regular inputs and outputs of are unprotected, and need not be encoded. This completes the description of Ì .
A simulation argument proving the correctness of this transformer proceeds very similarly to the stateless case analyzed above. In fact, a sequence of invocations of a stateful circuit may be unwound into a larger stateless circuit with an equivalent functionality. Here, the initial state is viewed as a hidden input, and the final state as a hidden output. Thus, the security proof for the stateful case essentially reduces to that of the stateless case. 10 In the "unwound" circuit, the adversary can corrupt up to Ø wires in each of the concatenated circuits É produced by the stateless transformation. The simulation proof proceeds exactly as before; the additional corruptions do not obstruct the proof because of the re-randomization property: the outputs of one É are Ø-wise independent conditioned on all the values of the inputs to É; thus in order to provide a full joint simulation of the entire unwound circuit, we need only be able to recover a bounded set of inputs from each component É. To 
Statistically Private Transformers
In this section we obtain statistically-private transformers which improve the previous constructions when the privacy threshold Ø is large. For the description and analysis of these transformers, it is convenient to rely on the following notion of average-case security. We note that a Ô-adversary as above is roughly the same as an adversary that corrupts a uniformly random subset of Ô ¼ wires in ¼ . Intuitively, average-case privacy in this sense should be easier to realize than the standard (worst-case) notion of privacy. Indeed, the circuit transformer from the previous section with additive shares (i.e., Ñ ) is perfectly private with respect to any adversary corrupting wires in each gadget. It follows that the view of an adversary corrupting each wire with probability, say, ½ ´½¼ µ can be perfectly simulated except with negligible failure probability. Thus, we have: In contrast, achieving worst-case privacy against an adversary corrupting ª´ ¼ µ of the wires in ¼ appears to be much harder; in particular, the constructions from the previous section are very far from achieving this when ¼ . The key idea underlying the asymptotic improvements in this section is the following reduction from worst-case privacy to average-case privacy.
Definition 1. A circuit transformer Ì Ì´ µ is said to be (statistically)
We start with an efficient circuit transformer Ì guaranteeing Ô-privacy in the average case. We then transform its output ¼ Ì´ µ into a larger circuit ¼ , which in a sense may be viewed as a "sparse" implementation of ¼ . The circuit ¼ will carry out the same computation performed by ¼ in essentially the same way, but will effectively utilize only a small random subset of its wires; all remaining wires of ¼ will be independent of the inputs and thus rendered useless to the adversary. We stress that the subset of useful wires in ¼ will only be determined during the invocation of ¼ and will therefore be independent of the set of corrupted wires. Hence, for an appropriate choice of parameters, the (worst-case) Ø-privacy of ¼ will reduce to the average-case Ô-privacy of ¼ .
We will describe two distinct instantiations of the above approach. The first is somewhat simpler, but incurs an Ç´Øµ ¡ Ç´½µ multiplicative blowup to the circuit size (see Remark 1) . When Ø , this already provides an asymptotic improvement over the previous solutions, which incur an Ç´Ø ¾ µ overhead. In the second construction, which is only sketched in this abstract, we manage to avoid the dependence on Ø by amortizing it over multiple gates.
Both instantiations make use of sorting networks as a building block. A sorting network is a layered circuit from integer-valued input wires to integer-valued output wires, which outputs its input sequence in a sorted order. The internal gates in a sorting network are of a very special type: each such gate, called a comparator, has two inputs and two outputs and returns its pair of inputs in a sorted order. The celebrated AKS network [1] achieves the optimal parameters of Ç´ ÐÓ µ size and Ç´ÐÓ µ depth.
However, in terms of practical efficiency it is preferable to use simpler sorting networks, such as Batcher's [5] Note that each such gadget can be implemented by a circuit of size Ç´ µ and depth ÔÓÐÝ´ÐÓ · ÐÓ µ.
To complete the description of ¼ , we describe a (simpler) gadget replacing each random bit gate Þ in ¼ . As in the gate gadget, the random bit gadget has inputs and outputs. The th input is a random bit Þ . A random selector Ö ¾ ℄ is used for determining which Þ will appear in the output. Specifically, the th output is set to Þ if Ö and to°otherwise. The cost of implementing this gadget is smaller than that of the gate gadget. Hence, the entire circuit ¼ has size Ç´ Òµ and depth comparable to that of ¼ (up to polylog factors).
We now establish the relation between the worst-case privacy of ¼ and the averagecase privacy of ¼ . Proof sketch: It is convenient to make the adversary slightly stronger by assuming that it may actually probe Ø logical, rather than boolean, wires (i.e., each such wire may contain an integer, a ternary symbol, or a bit). For each compromised wire of ¼ , the adversary can either see some random integer Ö , a°symbol, or an actual value Ú of the th wire of ¼ . 11 In the latter case, we say that Ú has been observed. Let Ë denote the set of indices such that Ú has been observed. Note that Ë is a random variable, where the probability is over the execution of ¼ .
We will argue that for any fixed index set Ë ¼ , and for chosen as in the lemma, we have ÈÖ Ë ¼ Ë℄ Ô Ë¼ . Thus, an adversary attacking any fixed set of Ø wires in ¼ is not better off than an adversary corrupting each wire of ¼ independently with probability Ô.
To make this argument, we pick a subset Ë ½ Ë ¼ such that: (1) Ë ½ Ë ¼ ; (2) each value in Ë ½ is observed with probability (at most) Ô ; and (3) the events of observing different values in Ë ½ are independent. This will make the probability of observing all values in Ë ½ at most´Ô µ Ë¼ Ô Ë¼ as required. We pick Ë ½ to be a maximal matching in the subgraph of ¼ induced by the wires in Ë ¼ . Since the degree of each vertex in this graph is at most 4, we have Ë ½ Ë ¼ . It remains to show that Ë ½ satisfies properties (2) and (3) above.
To prove (2) it suffices to show that for any fixed wire of ¼ , the probability that this wire contains a useful value (i.e., contributes to Ë) is Ç´½ µ. (Property (2) would then follow, since by taking the union over all Ø compromised wires of ¼ , the probability of observing a value of ¼ is Ç´Ø µ Ô .) This clearly holds for input wires, by definition of the input encoder, and is maintained through all internal wires in the circuit by a symmetry argument. (In the case of gate gadgets, the argument relies on the fact that each Ú Ð entry inside a sorting network contains one of the gadget's inputs, rather than some arbitrary combination of these inputs; due to the randomness of the sorting keys, the randomness of the positions of the useful entries is maintained).
It remains to argue that the independence property (3) holds. This follows from the fact that no two wires in Ë ½ are adjacent to a common gate in ¼ and from the fact that each gadget in ¼ uses fresh randomness to shuffle its entries.
Ù Ø
Combining Lemma 2 with Lemma 1, we have: Each value of ¼ is represented by a pair containing its index and its value. This representation naturally defines the input encoder and output decoder. It remains to show how the above representation can be maintained between subsequent layers. As before, we also need to ensure that each intermediate level in the computation of ¼ contains a random permutation of the useful values, where the randomness of these permutations is independent for levels that are sufficiently far apart. To achieve this, we use an -input, -output gadget whose inputs represent the th level wires in ¼ and whose outputs represent the´ ·½µth level wires. The high-level idea is as before, except that we now need to jointly route Û ¾ pairs of wires to random adjacent positions, and then combine each pair in the right way.
Using this approach, we can obtain the following theorem: An analogous theorem for the stateful model can be derived similarly to Theorem 4.
Next, we will show how to build a deterministic, stateful circuit that will produce pseudorandom output and remain secure even in the presence of probing attacks. In essence, we will be building a PRG that resists probing attacks. Because the resulting circuit is deterministic, this is helpful if true randomness is expensive. The basic construction is as follows. Let ¼ ½ ¼ ½ ´¾Ø·½µ · be a PRG.
We will build a deterministic stateful circuit ¼ × ¼ Application: eliminating randomness gates. One application for our PRG construction is in eliminating randomness for the stateful circuit transformer of Section 4. Our basic solution for the stateless model, as described earlier, relies on the use of random bit gates within the transformed circuit Ì´ µ. An appealing consequence of our proberesistant PRG is that it allows to dispense with on-line randomness generation: an initial random seed can be coded into the initial state by Ì and (deterministically) "refreshed" at each invocation of the circuit.
Suppose our transformed circuit Ì´ µ uses random-bit gates. Let Ö be a stateless randomized circuit consisting of independent random-bit gates, each connected to a different output of Ö . If ¼ Ö × ¼ ¼ ℄ is any deterministic stateful circuit that is a secure translation of Ö , then we can replace the random-bit gates of Ì´ µ with the probe-
For instance, the deterministic, stateful PRG of Theorem 6 will do the job nicely. In this way, we can derandomize ¼ and obtain an efficient stateful, deterministic circuit that is computationally Ø-private and not too much larger than the original circuit.
Concluding Remarks
We have developed theoretical foundations for the problem of securing hardware against side channel attacks, and initiated a systematic study of this problem within our framework. In this initial study we restricted our attention to side channels that can be modelled by probing attacks, i.e. whose information leakage depends on a limited number of physical wires. It would be interesting to extend our framework and results to a wider class of realistic attacks. A step in this direction is taken by Micali and Reyzin [28] , who put forward a very general model for side channel attacks.
Another natural extension of the problem studied in this work is to allowing additional protection against fault attacks [7, 26] . Similarly to our problem, solutions to this more general problem can be based on existing protocols from the MPC literature. However, even the most efficient of these (e.g., [22] ) are still quite inefficient to implement on hardware. Obtaining better solutions in this setting, possibly under relaxed notions of security, remains an interesting challenge.
A Relation with Secure Multi-Party Computation
The problem studied in this paper is closely related to the problem of secure multiparty computation (MPC), introduced and first studied in [38, 19, 6, 12] and extensively studied thereafter. We begin by explaining the relation between the problems, and then highlight some important differences. THE MPC MODEL. In the most basic setting for secure MPC, Ò parties are connected by a complete network of point-to-point channels. Initially, each party holds a local input and an independent random input. The parties' goal is to evaluate some publicly known function of their inputs while hiding their inputs from each other. To this end, they interact via a prescribed protocol. The protocol proceeds in round, where at each round each party may send a message to every other party based on its input, its random input, and messages received in previous rounds. The protocol terminates at some predetermined round, in which all parties should output the correct value of . A protocol as above is said to be Ø-private if for any set Ì of at most Ø parties, the entire view of Ì (consisting of their inputs, random inputs, and received messages) reveals no more information about the other parties' inputs than what follows from their own inputs and the value of . Note that the latter information captures what must inevitably be learned. To better correspond to our circuit model, it is convenient to consider a slightly modified MPC model in which each of the Ò inputs is initially secret-shared among the parties (say, using Ò out of Ò additive sharing), and the output produced by the protocol is also secret-shared in a similar fashion. This allows to realize a stronger and simpler privacy requirement: every collusion of Ø players learns nothing from their interaction with the remaining players.
RELATION TO PRIVATE CIRCUITS. To illustrate the relation between the MPC model and our circuit model, we focus on the stateless case and ignore some unimportant technicalities. First, we show that any Ø-private protocol corresponds to some Ø-private circuit computing the same function. Consider the following "hardware implementation" of an Ò-party protocol as above. In each round of interaction, each player's local computation is implemented by a separate sub-circuit. When the players interact, each message bit is translated into a wire connecting the corresponding sub-circuits. Note that the Ø-privacy of the protocol guarantees Ø-privacy also in the circuit model. Indeed, if an adversary can violate the circuit's privacy by probing Ø wires, then it could have also violated the protocol's privacy by corrupting some Ø players who "own" these wires. 12 The converse relation also holds. Suppose that we are given a Ø-private circuit computing the function where the fan-in of each gate is at most 2. We use the circuit to define a protocol, in which each gate is owned by a distinct player. The circuit is evaluated by the players in a bottom-up fashion, starting with the encoded inputs and ending with an encoded output, where for each wire a message is sent from its source player to its destination players, and for each gate a local computation is performed by the corresponding player. It is not hard to see that if the circuit is ¾Ø-private, then the corresponding protocol is Ø-private. Indeed, a protocol-adversary corrupting Ø players learns content of at most ¾Ø wires in the circuit.
In light of the above, one might expect to obtain the best solutions to our problem via efficient hardware implementations of state-of-the-art protocols from the MPC literature. However, this is not really the case. For instance, the BGW protocol [6] (as well as subsequent optimizations [17, 13] ) requires each player to evaluate a degree-Ø polynomial on ¢´Øµ points for each gate of the circuit being evaluated. Consequently, the stateless circuit transformer that can be derived from this protocol is significantly less efficient than our transformer. This state of affairs stems from some major differences in the underlying optimization goals. First, the MPC literature puts much emphasis on tolerating a constant fraction of corrupted players, whereas in our setting the number of corruptions is viewed as being independent of the number of "players" (in particular, we are willing to settle for tolerating a miniscule fraction of corruptions). Second, the MPC setting typically views the communication complexity and the round complexity as the most important resources to optimize, placing the time complexity only as a third-order optimization goal. In contrast, the main optimization criterion in our case is the size of a circuit, which roughly (but not exactly) corresponds to the time complexity of the underlying protocol. Finally, our main (stateful) model is quite nonstandard from the MPC point of view, as it involves extra ingredients such as a one-time trusted precomputation (via the circuit transformer), a mobile adversary (as in [29, 10] ), and on-line inputs and outputs (as in [31, 8] ). To conclude, the problem we are posing is quite different from that of implementing standard MPC protocols at the hardware level.
